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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Arrest-Search and Seizure
Defendant was arrested by federal agents in the front room of his
four-room apartment under valid warrants of arrest charging him with
violation of the National Stolen Property Act. While he remained
handcuffed in the living room the arresting officers conducted a meticu-
lous five-hour search of the entire apartment, looking through clothes,
chest and bureau drawers, personal effects, under the carpets, and gen-
erally ransacking the home. Near the close of the search, evidence of
violation of the Selective Service Act was discovered in a sealed envelope
taken from a bedroom dresser drawer. There was no search warrant.
Prior to trial for the latter offense, defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence as having been obtained by search violating his rights under
the Fourth Amendment was denied, and objections to the evidence on
trial were overruled.' A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction on the grounds that the search was incidental to lawful
arrest and conducted in good faith to find instruments of the crime and
was therefore not unreasonable. 2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." A search and
seizure conducted under authority of a validly executed search warrant
is not unreasonable. 4 Likewise, a search and seizure conducted without
warrant, but as an incident to a lawful arrest is not unreasonable. 5 The
IThe -federal courts are committed to the rule initially announced in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) that evidence obtained from a person by
unlawful search and seizure is, on proper objection, inadmissible against him in
any criminal proceeding. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Weeks
v. United States,.232 U. S. 383 (1914). Not all-of the states adhere to the fed-
eral rule; see Cora, ius, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SrazURE §7, pp. 46-7 (1926).
'Harris v. United States, - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1013 (1946). Cancelled checks, thought to have been stolen by Harris and
used to effect a forgery were the object of the search as instruments of the crime.
The Chief Justice, writing for the majority of the court, emphasizes the point that
the thoroughness of the search was not inappropriate for the discovery of such
objects. This was also stressed in the opinion of the lower court, 151 F. 2d
837 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), the conclusion being reached that by its nature and
purpose a search incidental to lawful arrest may be more extensive than that con-
ducted under a valid search warrant.
' Similar or identical provisions are contained in the constitutions of each of
the forty-eight states. They are collected in CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra, note 13,
§2. ' Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 308 (1921).
'Since the constitutional provisions for the security of the person and property
are to be construed liberally to prevent encroachment upon individual rights, the
implication is generally drawn from the Fourth Amendment that ordinarily searches
conducted without the authority of a search warrant are unreasonable. Gouled v.
United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32
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extent to which the search and seizure may be carried in the first in-
stance is governed by the terms of the warrant itself.6  In the latter
the extent of the search is defined by the courts. Generally the police
have the power, upon the making of a lawful arrest, to search without
warrant the pergon of the accused and the place where the arrest is
made for fruits of the crime or instruments by which it was committed
or weapons that might be used to escape custody.7 There is no real
problem regarding the extent to which the arrested person may be
searched-the pockets of the clothing he is wearing may be searched,"
clothing temporarily laid aside,9 a suit case or bag, whether carried in
the hand'0 or lying nearby." Articles, such as keys, thus seized from
the person have been used to gain access to the person's automobile or
building, and search thereof held reasonable.
12
There has been considerable confusion in the courts, however, in
their efforts to determine the extent to which a search of the place of
arrest may be carried, and it is with this problem that the court in the
principal case is concerned. The most common tests devised to define
the "place" of arrest are phrased in such variable language as "the im-
mediate surroundings," "the premises within the prisoners control, or
(1927). "The most important exception, however, to the necessity for a search
warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to lawful arrest." Ror-
SCHAEFER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 745 (1939). This right has been prac-
ticed since early times, People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923),
and has not been affected by constitutional limitations. Not only is it within the
power of the police to search without warrant upon arrest, but ". . . it is also
their duty... ." Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 23, 93 N. Y. S. 202 (1905).
'People v. Preuss, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N. W. 684 (1923).
If the arrest is not lawful, then any search following as an incident thereto
is unlawful. Peru v. United States, 4 F. 2d 881 (C. C. A. 8th 1925). Also, the
arrest must precede the search in point of time or at least be ,contemporaneous
with it, United States v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511 (S. D. N. Y. 1946) ;. and fur-
ther, it must usually appear clearly to the court that the entry was sought for
the purpose of arrest, not search. Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (C. C. A.
9th 1936) ; United States v. Vleck, 17 F. Supp. 110 (D. C. Neb. 1936).
'People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923).
People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
"0 Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. R. 218, 12 S. W. 2d 1015 (1929) ; cf. State v.
Jenkins, 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928) (where arrested person refused to
allow search of suitcase, ,officer may detain him until search warrant is obtained).
" Ragland v., Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 598, 265 S. W. 15 (1924); People v.
Ruthenburg, 229 Mich. 315, 202 N. W. 358 (1925).
2 "In People v. Garrett, 232 Mich. 366, 205 N. W. 95 (1925) an automobile key
/
was seized during search of the arrested person, the auto several blocks away
unlocked and a search thereof held reasonable. Search of a building allowed in
Martin v. United States, 155 F. 2d 503 (C. C. A. 5th 1946) where entry gained
by key taken during search of the owner arrested beside it. A trunk check may
be taken from the person lawfully arrested and used to obtain and search the
trunk. United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) ; accord,
Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927) (key taken from bar
in plain view of arresting officers used to gain access to nearby basement). But
cf. State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858 (1924) (search of safety deposit
box without warrant held unreasonable after key to box seized from arrested
person).
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within his possession," or "the area to which his unlawful activities ex-
tend"; and in applying them to a multitude of fact situations not wholly
consistent results have been reached. Though "each particular case in-
volving the question of an unreasonable search and seizure must be
determined on its own facts and circumstances,"'-3 what limitations will
be imposed in a given case upon search of the place of arrest depends
in large measure upon where the accused is apprehended; i.e., whether
in an automobile, in his yard, business establishment, or home. Exam-
ination of some of the results announced and legal reasoning employed
in these situations will aid in appraising the import of the case under
comment.
Extensive freedom is allowed the arre sting officer in the automobile
cases. Thus, as incidental to lawful arrest of a driver, search may be
made inside the car,14 behind the cushions, 15 in the side pockets,16 and
in the back compartments,' 7 on the theory that the entire vehicle is in
the driver's possession and control. And this is true even though the
search and seizure have no relation to the offense which prompted the
arrest,18 whether it be speeding, 19 a traffic violation,2 0 or drunkenness.2'
As a result of the famous Carrol2 case, arrest of a driver and search of
" Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927); Go-Bart Im-
porting Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931) ("There is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness. Fach case is to be decided on its own
lacts and circumstances").
State v. Hughlett et al., 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923).
Haverstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E. 625 (1925).
"o Callahan v. State, 42 Old. Cr. R. 425, 276 Pac. 494 (1929).
1 7Thomas v. State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N. E. 850 (1925).
H averstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N. E. 625 (1925) ("The fact that
articles found on his person or in his immediate possession were being used in the
commission of an offense other than the one for which the arrest was made is
not sufficient cause for excluding evidence of what the search discloses.") ; Toliver
v. State, 133 Miss. 789, 98 So. 342 (1923) ; Note 18 CAIFn. L. REv. 673 (1930).
There is some doubt as to the application of this reasoning where premises other
than automobiles are involved; thus, in United States v. Boyd, 1 F. 2d 1019
(W. D. Wash 1924) where an officer detected odor of smoking opium, was ad-
mitted to the house and there seized narcotics, he was not also authorized to
seize liquor; the crime committed in his presence only supplied the function of a
search warrant and authorized a search only for the particular offense. However,
in United States v. Charles, 8 F. 2d 302 (N. D. Cal. 1925) a seizure under similar
circumstances was allowed. Although the problem of the proper subject of
seizure is directly involved in the principal case, it is beyond the scope of the
present note. For other cases see United States v. Seltzer, 5 F. 2d 364 (D. Mass.
1925) (counterfeit stamps seized during search for liquor) ; People v. Harter, 244
Mich. 346, 221 N. W. 302 (1928) (liquor seized while looking through house for
person); People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922) (house
entered to arrest disorderly occupants, liquor in plain view seized).
10 Jameson v. State, 196 Id. 483, 149 N. E. 51 (1925).
Und States v. Jankowski, 28 F. 2d 800 (C. C. A. 2d 1928).
2 Patrick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 83, 250 S. W. 507 (1923). As to search
of wagon following arrest for drunkenness see Cole v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky.
543, 257 S. W. 713 (1924); Woods v. State, 37 Okl. Cr. R. 377, 258 Pac. 816
(1927).
2 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) (since automobiles, ships,
wagons and other vehicles are easily removed beyond the hand of the law long
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the automobile on public highways is reasonable if the officer has prob-
able cause to believe goods are thereby being illegally transported. In
such case, keys may be taken from the person and used to gain access to
compartments of the car.23
Where the person is arrested on his own property the right of search
extends a reasonable distance from the place of arrest to include the
land,24 garages,25 sheds26 and other buildings not used as a dwelling.
Thus, 25 feet has been held a reasonable distance because not beyond
the extent of the offender's unlawful activities ;27 likewise, a barn 100
feet away, since it ". . . was in the immediate vicinity of the place
where the arrest was made." 28  But, under these circumstances the
private dwelling may not be searched, the power of search incidental
to lawful arrest existing as to the home only when the accused is appre-
hended within it.2 It was so held in the leading case of Agnello v.
United States0 where officers searched Agnello's home shortly after
arresting him in another's house several doors away. The right to
search the dwelling without warrant was similarly denied where def end-
ant was arrested in front of his house,3 1 in his yard,32 in an automobile
driving away from the house,33 at his place of work.3 4 Although there
before a search warrant can be obtained, as to them a different rule from that
relating to the search of the dwelling must be employed) ; see Note 4 TEx. L. REv.
241 (1926) reviewing the rule of the Carroll case in the light of later decisions,
emphasizing its limited scope in supporting search on probable cause.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925) ("Belief, however well
founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no
justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are
held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause ") ; and
recently, "The law does not permit [a search] merely because there is probable
cause to believe contraband articles may be found on the premises." United States
v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511, 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1946). Courts have implied that
probable cause may justify a somewhat more extensive search incident to arrest
than would otherwise be deemed reasonable. State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77,
136 S. E. 703 (1927). For additional materials see Corwin, The Supreme Courts
Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. Rlv. 1, 207 (1903)
and Note 10 N, C. LAW Rtv. 79 (1931).
" Thomas v. State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N: E. 850 (1925).
", Koth v. United States, 16 F. 2d 59 (C. C. A. 9th 1927). Of course, open
fields do not come within the protection of the Fourth Amendment, and so may
be searched without warrant or arrest of owner. Hester v. United States, 265
U. S. 57 (1924).
22 State v. Estes, 151 Wash. 51, 274 Pac. 1053 (1929).
28 State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181, 270 Pac. 665 (1928).
2TShew v. United States, 155 F. 2d 628 (C. C. A. 4th 1946).
-8 Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843, 847 (C. C. A. 8th 1932)
Weeks v. United States. 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
20269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925) (". . . it has always been assumed that one's house
cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a
lawful arrest therein .... The search of a private dwelling without a warrant
is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.").
" Poulos v. United States, 8 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 6th 1925) ; Thomas v. State,
27 Old. Cr. R. 264, 226 Pac. 600 (1924).22Fowler v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. R. 69, 22 S. W. 2d 935 (1930)22Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (C. C. A. 9th 1936).
2' Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. (1914).
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are cases failing to apply this rule in certain situations35 it has long
been the federal law and adhered to by a large majority of the state
courts. 6
There is a sharp division of opinion, most clearly exemplified in the
federal cases, as to how broad an area a search incident to arrest in
one's place of business may cover. The view that it may go ". . . to
the extent that the offender's control and activities likely extend" is ex-
pressed in Sayers v. United States,37 where search was allowed in private
rooms across the hall from the place of arrest, the court reasoning,
".... of a person arrested, every garment and pocket may be searched,
and the same principle authorizes that of a building, generally every
room may be searched."38  Quoting this language with approval, lower
federal courts have upheld searches of the back room in a drugstore
following arrest of the owner in the front portion,39 of the basement to
a soft drink parlor after arrest on the main floor,4° of a proprietor's
living quarters in his hotel after arrest in the lobby,41 and search and
seizure of physician's prescription card file after arrest in his office.4
Representing a contrary view is a statement by Judge Learned Hand
" In Patton v. State, 43 Old. Cr. R. 436, 279 1ac. 694 (1929) where D, upon
approach of officers, fled from the back door of his house and was captured some
20 feet away, search of the home was allowed on grounds the arrest was imma-
nently associated with the house, thus distinguishing the case from Wallace v.
State, 42 Old. Cr. R. 143, 275 Pac. 354 (1929) where D was arrested in the
front yard and search of the dwelling was specifically said to be prohibited. In
State v. Evans, 145 Wash. 4, 258 Pac. 845, 849 (1927) the court, after stating
the rule allowing a search of the dwelling after arrest therein, said, "In this
instance the defendant was on his way to his place of residence and the fact he
was caught before he reached the place ought not to require the application of a
different rule." This case and the broad language employed in State v. Much, 156
Wash. 403, 287 Pac. 57 (1930) have led the Washington court to some rather
extreme results; State v. Thomas, 183 Wash. 643, 49 P. 2d 28 (1935) (search
of dwelling made before arrest but allowed on grounds seizure took place with
arrest) ; State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P. 2d 165, 141 P. 2d 613 (1943)
(search of dwelling allowed a day after arrest took place in a hospital). But a
vigorous dissent was filed in the latter case, and in City of Tacoma v. Houston,
177 P. 2d 886 (Wash. 1947), the court referred to the language of the Evans case
quoted herein as dictum.
"o Searches of the dwelling have been allowed following an arrest outside the
home where officer enters with the prisoner and at his request. Soderberg v. State,
31 Okl. Cr. R. 88, 237 Pac. 467 (1925) ; State v. Beaupre, 149 Wash. 675, 272 Pac.
26 (1928). The latter case, relying on Evans v. State, supra note 35, probably
goes to an extreme finding little sanction in other courts, inasmuch as the de-
fendant there had been taken to jail before the search commenced. See note 56
infra.
.7 2 F. 2d 146 (C. C. A. 9th 1924).
" Ibid., at page 147. It should be noted that the court found that criminal
activity, extending throughout the premises, was being carried on in officers' pres-
ence, and that the place was evidently open to the public for the sale of illegal
liquor, thereby becoming a place of business and no longer a dwelling for these
purposes.
" United States v. Seltzer, 5 F. 2d 364 (D. Mass. 1925).
" Dibello v. United States, 19 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 8th 1927) (using language
similar to that of Sayers case)., United States v. Charles, 8 F. 2d 302 (N. D. Cal. 1925).
" United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
19471
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that, "Whatever the casuistry of border cases, it is broadly a totally
different thing to search a man's pockets and use against him what they
contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incrim-
inate him once you have gained lawful entry,"43  Apparently approving
this view, the United States Supreme Court has denied the right to
search articles of furniture in an office as incidental to valid arrest made
in the same room, where no conspiracy or illegal activity is being carried
on in the officers' presence.
44
As the courts have consistently proclaimed that one's home is to be
distinguished from other types of premises for these purposes, 45 our
final inquiry is, to what extent then may a search of the dwelling be
conducted in a situation such as the principal case presents, viz., in con-
junction with a valid arrest in the dwelling? Clearly, all courts will
concede that it may cover that which is within easy view of the officer
as he takes the person into custody ;40 so that upon lawful entry whiskey
on the table 47 or narcotics hurriedly thrown in an open closet48 may be
seized. And most courts agree that clothing,49 furniture drawers,50
suitcases51 and other possessions in the room 52 are subject to examina-
tion. The courts then seem to have gone no further, strictly limiting
the search to the room of arrest or those places to which the officer
must' go to execute the arrest,53 unless the premises is deemed a place
" United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).
" In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) a search
of papers, records, desks, and a safe, following an arrest in defendant's office was
held to be general and exploratory and therefore unreasonable; likewise, a search
of desks, a towel cabinet, wastepaper baskets and papers in United States v. Lefko-
witz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). Both cases distinguished Marron v. United States, 275
U. S. 192 (1927) (search of room of arrest, adjoining closet, and seizure of papers
allowed on grounds that in that case the criminal enterprise for which the arrest
was made was being carried on in the officer's presence and things seized were
visible and accessible and in the offender's control).
,3 Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946).
"State v. Benson, 91 Mont. 21, 5 P. 2d 223 (1931) ; State v. Laundy, 103 Ore.
443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922).
I"People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922); People v.
Harter, 244 Mich. 346, 221 N. W. 302 (1928).
,8 Gaines v. State, 28 Okl. Cr. R. 353, 230 Pac. 946 (1924).
'9 Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412 (App. D. C. 1923).5 0Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 244 Ky. 117, 5 S. W. 2d 887 (1928); People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641,
147 N. W. 525 (1914).
5 1Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923).
Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 23, 93 N. Y. S. 202 (1905) (Police may
search ". . . the person of one lawfully arrested, and also the room . . . in which
he is arrested, and also any other place to which they can get lawful access....").
" Following the language of Smith v. Jerome quoted supra note 52, People v.
Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923) held a warrant for arrest gave the
officer ". . . lawful access only to that part of the house which it was necessary
to enter in order to serve his warrant. Here, where he was lawfully present, he
could search for evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, but further
he could not go. . . ." Accord, In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C. C. A. 2d 1945)
(1312 hour search of 4 room apartment) ; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 244 Ky. 117,
5 S. W. 2d 887 (1928) (search in hall through which officer passed after making
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of business, 54 or is used to carry on a criminal enterprise.5 5 If the
search is not completed at the time the offender is taken, no return may
be made to the dwelling for that purpose.5"
Against this background, it would appear at first blush that Harris
v. United States has carried the law of search and seizure incidental to
arrest in the home far beyond any bounds heretofore established. But
it is submitted that actually it introduces a new test, viz., that the scope
of this type of search is not to be determined by arbitrary geographical,
physical or time limitations, but by whether or not the search was com-
mensurate with its object and made in good faith.57 It is not easy to
anticipate what effect the presence of this new test will have on the law
of search and seizure in the United States. In view of past cases one
would be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that "The decision
will be taken, in practice, as authority for a search of any home, office
or other premises if a warrant can be obtained for the arrest of any
occupant and the officer chooses to make the arrest on the premises,"58a
for in grasping for the general rather than the specific, one is inclined
to overlook its distinguishing feature, viz., that the ". . . instrumentalities
of the crimes charged in the warrants could easily have been concealed
in any of the four rooms of the apartment," so that in this case, a more
intensive and far reaching search was justified.59 It is hoped that the
case will be taken for that proposition and strictly limited to it, for it
should now be clear that the measure of security afforded by the Fourth
arrest in adjoining room); People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721
(1922) semble, see disseiting opinion; Cornelius, op. cit. supra note 1, page 162.
But cf. State v. One Buick Automobile, 120 Ore. 640, 253 Pac. 366 (1927) (arrest
in home, search connecting garage).
" United States v. 71.41 Ounces Gold, 94 F. 2d 17 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) ; Sayers
v. United States, 2 F. 2d 146 (C. C. A. 9th 1924).
" United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Picket v.
Marcucci's Liquors, 112 Conn. 169, 151 Ati. 526 (1930) ; State v. Adams, 103 W.
Va. 77, 136 S. E. 703, 704 (1927) ("In cases like this where there is no evidence
before the search of the corpus delicti, we are of opinion that the search should be
confined to the room or portion of the defendant's premises where the arrest ismade.").m People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923) ; except where goods
seized are too bulky to carry, Davis v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. R. 61, 234 Pac. 787
(1925) ; but then, return must not be unnecessarily delayed, Coffelt v. State, 36 Old.
Cr. R. 365, 254 Pac. 760 (1927).
" Harris v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 1102, 91 L. ed at 1017 (" . . the
area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be determined by the
fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted
to some other room of the apartment.").
GId. at 1119, 91 L. ed. at 1036 (dissenting opinion).
"'Id. at 1102, 91 L. ed. at 1017 ("Other situations may arise in which the
nature and size of the object sought or the lack of effective control over the
premises on the part of the persons arrested may require that the searches be less
extensive."). This suggestion presents at least two more factors with which the
courts must now contend, along with the already existing maze of generalities, in
deciding each case on its own facts and circumstances, i.e., the size of the object
and the meaning of "effective control"; and contains little to aid the law enforce-
ment officer in understanding the extent of his powers.
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Amendment, one of the most essential safeguards in our Bill of Rights,
depends in large part upon what limitations the courts define and main-
tain with respect to the right of search without warrant incidental to
lawful arrest. A misunderstanding of the Harris case may lead to such
an extension of these limitations -as to necessitate a sharp reversal of
policy if the constitutional guarantee is not to be lost.
ERNEST W. MACliEN, JR.
Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-Application of Res Judicata
and Erie v. Tompkins to Achieve Uniformity of
Law Within a State
In 1940, Angel, a citizen of North Carolina, purchased of Bullfngton,
a citizen of Virginia, land situated in Virginia and gave in payment
thereof a series of notes secured by. a purchase money deed of trust.
The contract was made in Virginia, and the notes were payable in Vir-
ginia. Angel defaulted, and Bullington, acting upon an acceleration
clause, caused the trustees to sell the land. A deficiency resulted. Bul-
lington sued Angel in a North Carolina superior court to recover the
deficiency. Angel demurred to the cause of action on the basis of the
following statute:
"In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees
under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust
executed after February 6, 1933, or where judgment or decree
is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage executed after Feb-
ruary 6, 1933, to secure the balance of the purchase price of real
property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured
by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a de-
ficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust,
or obligation secured by the same."'
The demurrer was overruled and Angel appealed. Bullington chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed,2 holding that the statute precluded the recovery of a
deficiency judgment arising out of purchase money deed of trust. It
said,8 "It will be noted that the limitation created by the statute is upon
the jurisdiction of the court .... This closes the courts of this State
to one whb seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the purchase
price of real property. The statute operates upon the adjective law of
the state, which pertains to the practice and procedure, or legal machin-
ery by which the substantive law is made effective, and not upon the
substantive law itself." It further said, in substance, that the legislature
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36.
2 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941).
Id. at 20, 16 S. E. 2d at 412.
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